East Tennessee was bitterly divided during the war with about two-thirds of the population still loyal to the Union.  Confederate forces during their occupation of East Tennessee had begun but not finished an earthwork in  Knoxville.   It was located on the western outskirts of town and was called Fort Loudon.    When Ambrose Burnside’s Union forces entered East Tennessee unopposed (Confederate forces had left to support Braxton Bragg in North Georgia) in September 1863, the majority of the population celebrated.  Inside the city of Knoxville itself, where Burnside located his headquarters, the majority of citizens had voted to secede from the Union.  They, obviously, were not pleased with Burnside’s presence.

   

    Knoxville and East Tennessee contained vital railroad connections to Virginia and the Deep South.  It was inevitable that Confederate forces would want to reclaim the area.  How it came about and the parties involved was less predictable. 

    After Confederate General Braxton Bragg routed Union forces at Chickamauga creek in Georgia, he thought he had them trapped in Chattanooga.   Perhaps he was over confident.  Perhaps he detested General James Longstreet enough to simply wanted rid of him.  Perhaps Longstreet himself was so anxious for independent command that he was unbearable.  Whatever the case, Longstreet took his Corps, left Chattanooga and marched woefully unprepared to take Knoxville. 

    His best opportunity to defeat Burnside was away from Knoxville’s defenses. The opportunity presented itself at Campbell’s Station some 20 miles west of the city.  Confederate forces doubled that of the Union soldiers which were acting as bait to draw Longstreet farther from Chattanooga. Feuding subordinates may have prevented a Longstreet victory at Campbell Station, but Burnside’s troops performed very well.  They didn’t need to win a skirmish they just needed to buy more time.

    As Burnside fell back to Knoxville he sent a message to Captain Orlando M. Poe to prepare for his arrival.  Poe immediately set out to improve the city’s defenses.  Troops and a number of contraband (former slaves)  worked night and day to strengthen the defensive line.  Burnside’s exhausted troops returned to Knoxville on November 16 followed closely by Longstreet’s forces the next day.  If Longstreet had attacked soon after arriving in Knoxville, he might have met with more success.  Every day he delayed played into the hands of engineer Poe.

    General William P. Sanders was a classmate of Poe’s and despite his rather poor academic performance at West Point, he proved to be a more than competent field commander.  Burnside asked Sanders to delay the Confederate advance on the western front.  Every minute meant Poe’s deadly plans to strengthen the fort could be put into place.  

    Sanders and about 600 of his cavalry and mounted infantry positioned themselves about a mile west of the fort.  Asked to hold his position at least until noon, Sanders was able to rally his men and hold the position until mid-afternoon.  He was mortally wounded while returning to his command position and died in the early morning hours of November 19.   Interestingly, on the afternoon of November 19 in Gettysburg, President Lincoln presented one of the most famous speeches in United State history,  The Gettysburg address.

    As it turned out Sanders’ delaying action may have been unnecessary.  Longstreet would not muster an attack for 10 more days.   In the predawn hours of November 29, Longstreet launched an assault on the northwest bastion of the earthwork, now known as Fort Sanders.  Because they had occupied the Union trenches around midnight, there was no element of surprise.  The brief artillery barrage to soften the fort’s defenses was not effective.  The attacking troops also had no way to mount the parapet.  Poe had made the ditch around the fort 6 to 8 feet deep with no berm for attacking troops to get a hand or foothold.  Confederate forces had no idea the northwest bastion was a death trap. 

    The fiasco lasted only 20 minutes.  At the launch of the attack a little over 100 Union soldiers were in the Northwest Bastion and about 500 total inside the fort.  They faced nearly 4,000 of  Longstreet’s finest men yet it was a suicidal attack for the Confederates.  The ditch trapped them and they could not escape.  128 were killed and many of those died in the ditch by improvised hand grenades.  A handful made it over the parapet but were either killed or captured immediately

    There has been some speculation about how many of Longstreet’s 4,000 men actually were engaged in the battle.   With the reconstructed fort as reference, it is only possible to pack a little over 1.000 men side by side in the ditch where the attack took place.  The killing zone of an earthwork is in the land leading up to the ditch.  Withering fire would encourage attacking troops either to jump into the ditch now completely full or retreat.  It seems likely that only one-third of Longstreet’s forces could make a meaningful assault.  This does not discount the bravery of the troops.   With no way forward, it would have been foolish to remain as targets in the killing zone.

    After the attack failed, Longstreet contemplated his next move.  Within minutes a message arrived saying Grant had broken out of Chattanooga and Bragg was in retreat.  No second attack was launched and Longstreet left Knoxville for winter quarters on December 4.  He continued to be a bother to Union forces until he left to rejoin General Lee in Virginia.